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Introduction: Military Maintenance  
in Early Modern Europe
The Northern Exposure
Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvist
University of Helsinki
Military and civil spheres are more or less isolated enclaves in 
our present-day Western world. Soldiers live and operate separate 
from the rest of the society, and, besides the annual parades and 
the possible compulsory military service, these two worlds have 
little contact. Wars are even more remote incidents, as they are 
mostly fought in far-away countries.
In early modern Europe, the situation was different. Not only 
was the continent war-torn, but the civil and military spheres 
were also closely interwoven during peacetime. The period from 
the 16th century onwards has been characterised as the age of 
military revolution: warfare was modernised, the size of armies 
grew rapidly, and more and more state revenues were needed to 
construct fortresses and navies, as well as to fund and provision 
the troops. Scholars like Geoffrey Parker have even attributed the 
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birth of the modern bureaucratic state to the military revolution, 
as nations had to collect their taxes and manage their resources 
more efficiently than before to sustain their growing armies.1
Pre-19th-century armies were not public institutions to the 
same extent that they are today – or at least were during the 19th 
and 20th centuries. European rulers delegated the construction of 
warships and fortresses to private contractors, and their services 
were also used for arms and munitions manufacturing, clothing, 
army transportation and the provisioning of armies and navies. 
Furthermore, intermittent warfare was often funded by wealthy 
merchants and other private individuals, who became important 
financiers and subcontractors for the crown.
In the past few decades, there has been a marked global trend 
towards privatisation in national services and an increased use of 
contractors in military supply and operations. Arguably, all West-
ern armies have become more or less dependent on private sup-
pliers and security services. To understand this development, it 
is worth looking back at how armies were sustained before the 
French Revolution. Early modern states could not have managed 
without resorting to civilians – national or foreign – specialised in 
bridging the gap between supply and demand.
***
The prevalence of private contracting and the army’s dependence 
on civilian maintenance has been highlighted by several historians 
discussing the nature of early modern warfare. One of the early 
major examples is Fritz Redlich’s 1960s study The German Military 
Enterpriser and His Work Force, which traces the evolution of 
mercenary troops in Germany between 1450 and 1650.2 Also, 
the importance of the billeting system has been recognised in the 
earlier research.3 It is justified to argue, however, that, during 
 1 Parker 1988.
 2 Redlich 1966; also, Géza Perjés refers to contractors in his compara-
tive article on army provisioning in Europe: Perjés 1970, pp. 49–51.
 3 See, e.g. van Creveld 1977, p. 7.
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the past 20 years or so, the theme has received much more sys-
tematic attention in historical research than before, and, as a result 
of this renewed interest in non-state actors’ involvement, some of 
the established conceptions of civil–military relations have 
been challenged.
Most recent studies concentrate on the outsourcing of military 
activities, which was a common practice throughout Europe in 
the early modern period and particularly in France, Spain, Britain 
and the Netherlands, as well as in several German principalities. 
According to David Parrott, 17th-century military commanders 
were basically proprietors of their regiments, acting relatively 
independently through their own networks of arms producers, 
merchants, transport operatives and creditors.
The level of outsourcing was probably highest in Britain, where 
responsibility for most war supplies and manufacturing was 
assumed by private entrepreneurs rather than by government 
establishments during the 18th century. Uniforms, equipment, pro-
visions, and horse fodder were purchased on contract, and large 
fortifications in England were built by contractors. Also, the vast 
majority of British warships were provided by merchant shipyards. 
Traditionally, merchants operating in the military business have 
been accused of rent-seeking at the expense of the crown, but recent 
studies have found that the level of corruption was actually quite 
low. In reality, the British military supply system worked in a highly 
efficient manner, which partly explains Britain’s naval and military 
success in the Seven Years War and in the Napoleonic Wars.4
What is common to all the studies mentioned above is their 
desire to re-examine established conceptions about the impact of 
war and military organisation in state formation. According to the 
older standard narrative, put forward especially by Charles Tilly, 
the nearly constant and resource-demanding nature of warfare 
between the late 15th and early 19th centuries forced European 
rulers to centralise their administration and to develop efficient 
and meritocratic administrative machineries to collect resources 
– land, labour and capital – from the territories they ruled. As 
 4 Lynn 1997; Bannerman 2008; Knight & Wilcox 2010; Parrott 2012; 
Goossens 2014; Torres-Sánchez 2016; Torres-Sánchez et al. 2018. 
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regards the armed forces, they had also been absorbed directly 
into the state’s administrative structure by the 18th century, dras-
tically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors.
Historical literature on the topic has termed this new type of 
state the national state, the power state, the military state, or the 
fiscal-military state. According to Jan Glete, the lattermost term is 
the most useful one, because it puts equal emphasis on the income 
and expenditure parts of resource flows: European state budgets 
became enormously inflated during the early modern period, and 
most of the revenues were spent on war.5
David Parrott criticises these basic conceptions of state-capacity 
theorists by suggesting that ‘the scale, competence and resources 
of early modern governments have been greatly overestimated, 
and their capacity to achieve objectives correspondingly exag-
gerated’. In France, offices were sold to the wealthy elite to raise 
funds for the state, not to increase the efficacy of the administra-
tion. Elsewhere, the number of employees of the crown remained 
small and their freedom of action was curtailed by individual, 
territorial and institutional prerogatives.
The extensive outsourcing of public authority to private con-
tractors offered a solution to these restrictions; it was the most 
efficient means of mobilising military resources considering the 
limited political and administrative capabilities of early modern 
rulers. According to Parrott, the evolution of military enterprise 
created mechanisms by which rulers managed to achieve ‘a more 
extensive and effective mobilisation of private resources than 
would otherwise have been possible from their own fiscal and 
administrative capacities’. In that sense, there is no incompatibility 
between the growth of the power of the state and the development 
of a substantial sphere of private military activity.6
Why, then, were the contractors willing to offer credit and other 
services to the state despite the fact that wars were unpredictable 
events and the risk of losing everything was high? According 
 5 Tilly 1990; Glete 2010, p. 9.
 6 Parrott 2012, p. 316. See also Fynn-Paul et al. 2014, p. 10; Torres- 
Sánchez 2016. 
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to David Parrott, the principal motivation was profit: ‘Financial 
reward was a driving force in explaining the attraction of mili-
tary enterprise, and must be explored as a primary motive for 
the involvement of many commanders and colonels, as well as 
for those bankers and financiers who were willing to underwrite 
their activities, and those who provided the war goods, munitions 
and foodstuffs on credit against anticipated returns from military 
success.’ Likewise, social ambitions – noble titles, enhanced social 
status, and reinforced political standing in relation to the ruler – 
were important background factors, although Parrott admits that 
military enterprise was not ‘an easy and much-frequented route 
from obscure origins to high noble status’.7
A third model has been offered by Jan Glete, who emphasises 
the state’s role in the market with respect to protection and the 
control of violence. According to him, different social groups were 
willing to cooperate with the state in exchange for protection for 
their own activities. For instance, merchants involved in foreign 
trade benefited from rulers’ capability to control the seas. Glete’s 
explanation accepts that, in some European states, private con-
tracting was used because rulers did not have enough administra-
tive skills and power to run armed forces on their own. He insists, 
however, that ambitious rulers had ‘strong incentives to develop 
superior administrative capabilities of their own, and such capa-
bilities made it easier for them to cooperate with private groups 
who also had competence and access to resources’. In his view, 
private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers capable of 
actually ruling their territories.8
However, the phenomenon also had a reverse – and much less 
researched – side. Not all civilians involved in military mainte-
nance were wealthy merchants and ‘entrepreneurial commanders’ 
in search of profit and status. Common townspeople and rural 
communities were also massively involved in such maintenance 
operations in early modern Europe.
 7 Parrott 2012, pp. 241–250.
 8 Glete 2002; Glete 2010, p. 663.
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Giulio Ongaro’s recent work Peasants and Soldiers explores this 
side of the equation by concentrating on the Republic of Venice, 
where rural families provided hay, wood and housing for mer-
cenary troops, which the republic recruited almost constantly. 
Moreover, Venetian communities had to provide men and weap-
ons for rural militia – a numerically substantial subject army that 
was used for garrison duties and defensive warfare – and to ensure 
that the soldiers received adequate training and compensation. 
The agrarian population was also needed for the construction of 
fortresses, saltpetre production, and other military-related work.
Ongaro’s premises differ from studies devoted to military con-
tracting in that he includes all the non-state actors in his analy-
sis, including the rural elite, manual labourers, and peasants. 
Some of these groups, such as estate owners, managed to ben-
efit financially from the militarisation of the countryside, but in 
many Venetian regions the increased needs for provisioning and 
providing lodging for troops, together with the conscription of 
militiamen, oarsmen and sappers, caused severe economic diffi-
culties for rural dwellers.9 The same kind of argument has also 
been made for other European regions. According to Myron 
Gutmann, the lodgement of troops was the real scourge for the 
people in the Low Countries, rather than battles and sieges.10
***
The early modern Swedish Realm was, administration-wise, one of the 
most advanced countries in Europe. After emerging from the Middle 
Ages by cutting ties with the Danish-led Kalmar Union in the 1520s, 
it evolved quickly into an effective bureaucratic state under the 
forceful rule of the House of Vasa. A well-functioning government, 
efficient tax-collecting system and powerful military machine ena-
bled the northern kingdom to become a European superpower.
 9 Ongaro 2017.
 10 Gutmann 1980.
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During the so-called Swedish Age of Greatness, which more or 
less overlapped with the 17th century, the Swedes were in a near-
constant state of war with neighbouring nations – the Russian 
Empire, Poland, the German states and Denmark. Exploiting the 
military weakness and national disunity of their neighbours, they 
created a multinational realm that ruled most of the coasts of 
the Baltic Sea (see Figure 1.1). This greatness, however, was not 
permanent – the large and disjointed new realm was difficult to 
rule and vulnerable to attacks.
Figure 1.1: The Swedish conquests in 1560–1660. 
Source: Toivo 2007, p. 87. Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.
8 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
In the devastating Great Northern War (1700–1721), the neigh-
bours, who had caught up with the Swedes through their own 
military revolutions, got their revenge. As the result of the war, 
the Swedish Realm was reduced to its pre-greatness borders and 
downgraded to a second-rate European power.
In the 18th century, the Swedes turned from front-runners to 
underdogs. Most of their military budget went to the defence 
of their new smaller realm, rather than to waging wars of con-
quest, and the few wars they partook in ended more or less 
catastrophically. The Finnish War (1808–1809) marked the 
final humiliation: the old Swedish Realm was split in half, with 
Finland being annexed by the Russian Empire and the remaining 
part of the realm continuing its existence as the new Kingdom 
of Sweden.
As the Swedish military evolved, so too did the ways to man and 
maintain the army. For most of the Age of Greatness, the Swedish 
army was conscripted separately for every war, with every village 
obliged to provide able-bodied men to the service of the crown. 
From the 1680s onwards, conscription was replaced by the allot-
ment system, which allowed the realm to have a low-cost and rea-
sonably effective standing army. The villages were now obliged to 
recruit soldiers and give them a cottage and a patch of land. When 
such soldiers were not at war or tending to military exercises, they 
lived the life of a smallholding farmer.
The allotment system was in effect for all of the 18th century, 
but enlisted troops increasingly gained in stature beside it. Rap-
idly developing military branches such as the navy, as well as artil-
lery and fortifications, could not be manned by allotted troops, as 
they required soldiers who were in permanent service. This 
increased the size and importance of enlisted troops within the 
Swedish military machine. Unlike the allotted soldiers, who 
resided at the countryside, enlisted troops were a distinctively 
urban phenomenon, as the garrisons, naval bases and fortresses 
were concentrated in towns.
The early modern Swedish Realm is a well-known and often-
cited case amongst international military historians. Michael 
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Roberts, who fathered the concept of military revolution in the 
1950s, was a specialist in Swedish history and based his theoretical 
approach on Swedish examples.11 Also, Swedish historians them-
selves have been active in reworking and refining the concept. The 
front-runner has been the aforementioned Jan Glete, whose works 
on the connections between naval history and state-building are 
considered international classics.12
The concept, however, has also been fiercely attacked. Critics of 
Michael Roberts, such as Jeremy Black, have accused him on rely-
ing too much on Swedish history and thus overplaying the role of 
military in state-building. According to these critics, the Swedish 
Realm, with its reasonably well-functioning and uncorrupted 
governmental machine, was a European anomaly rather than a 
representative case.13
In building and upkeeping their military machine, the Swedes 
were eager to adopt the European models of maintenance. How-
ever, those models were developed in Western and Central Europe, 
where the populations were dense, distances short, agriculture 
productive, and towns large and wealthy. The Swedish Realm was 
a large and scarcely populated country where distances were long 
and weather harsh, and most of its towns would barely have been 
considered villages in the wealthier parts of the continent.
Many of the problems encountered by armies throughout 
Europe – such as the difficulty of gathering resources and organ-
ising transportation during autumn and winter months – were 
much more severe in the Swedish Realm.14 Some problems, 
in addition, were unique to the north – the freezing sea cut off 
maritime connections and made boat transportations impossible 
during wintertime, a problem that entrepreneurial commanders 
in Britain or France rarely had to consider.
 11 Roberts 1988.
 12 See, e.g. Glete 2002; Glete 2010.
 13 Black 1991.
 14 See, e.g. Black 1991, pp. 40–42.
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Although Sweden is a well-known and often-cited case, his-
torians like Michael Roberts and Jan Glete have researched the 
interaction between military and civil society mainly at the upper 
level, analysing the impact of military evolution on state forma-
tion and the development of modern bureaucracy. The grassroots 
level, namely the role played by ordinary towns and rural com-
munities in Sweden and Finland in terms of financing, feeding, 
accommodating and provisioning the army, has attracted 
less attention.
The role of civilians in army maintenance has been studied 
mainly during wartime. Most recently, Christer Kuvaja has stud-
ied how the Russian army utilised Finnish peasants for its main-
tenance operations during the occupation period of the Great 
Northern War (1713–1721), and Martin Hårdstedt has analysed 
the maintenance system of the Swedish army during the Finnish 
War (1808–1809).15 Peacetime civil–military interaction has so far 
been best analysed by the pan-Nordic research project Garnisons-
städer i norden (‘Garrison Towns in the North’) in the 1980s. The 
project analysed military towns in all the Nordic countries, with 
a special focus on the early modern period. However, it largely 
omitted themes like financing and maintenance, focusing on the 
military impact on the visual and demographic development of 
towns, and the rows and disputes between the army and civilian 
citizens regarding management of the local government and the 
right to conduct business in the military towns.16
***
The main objective of the present anthology is to analyse the 
role of civilians in the military supply systems in the early 
modern Swedish Realm, both in the towns and in the coun-
tryside. It aims to answer how the army sought to exploit 
 15 Kuvaja 1999; Hårdstedt 2002.
 16 See, e.g., Artéus 1997.
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civilians – burghers, peasants, entrepreneurs – in order to provi-
sion itself, and how the civil population managed to benefit from 
such cooperation.
David Parrott argues that typical early modern European gov-
ernments were ineffective, undermanned and corrupted, but 
managed to effectively mobilise military resources by cooperating 
with private under-contractors and financiers. At first glance, the 
situation seems to have been the reverse for the kings of Sweden: 
they had one of the most effective governments in Europe, but also 
a vast realm scarce of people and capital. The dichotomy between 
market-based and governmental allocation of resources lies at 
the core of this book. To what extent and in what ways were the 
Swedish decision makers able to utilise civil society in the build-
ing and upkeeping of its military machine, and how did the spe-
cial characteristics of the realm affect the said utilising?
The book does not concentrate on conscription, allotment or 
recruitment, which were arguably the most important ways that 
people in the towns and countryside subsidised the Swedish army. 
These themes have been actively studied by military historians 
both in Sweden and in Finland, and new openings have been pub-
lished even in recent years. Instead, it aims to give perspective to 
the much less researched theme of how the army used civil soci-
ety for its maintenance purposes: how did it purchase food, drink 
and accommodation for its soldiers and material for its needs, and 
how did it finance its military campaigns?
The outsourcing of military activities will be analysed in sev-
eral chapters focusing on such themes as the manufacturing 
of saltpetre, wartime credits and the provisioning of soldiers. 
These chapters offer an interesting point of comparison for stud-
ies devoted to more urbanised and densely populated regions. 
The different chapters are relatively independent of each other 
in terms of their approach to the overall themes of the book, 
as some of them are closely connected to the above-mentioned 
discussions on military enterprises and state formation, while 
others are more related to debates on civil–military relations in 
the Nordic countries.
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The concept of ‘civilians’ is understood broadly in the book. 
Several of its chapters discuss military officers who served as 
financers and providers of the Swedish army. As this financing 
and provisioning was not part of their official duties as officers, 
but a private business they ran on the side for various reasons – to 
gain financial profit, to look good in the eyes of the crown, or just 
to save their troops from starvation and slaughter – they are inter-
preted as civilian entrepreneurs.
The geographical focus of the book is the eastern part of the 
pre-1809 Swedish Realm. Referred during the Middle Ages simply 
as ‘Eastland’ (Österlandet), it was commonly known by the name 
of Finland during the early modern centuries. The eastern half of 
the realm was pivotal to the maintenance of the Swedish army, 
as it had strategic significance as a provider of raw materials, and 
it was Swedish Realm’s frontier against its perennial competitor, 
Russia. Most Russo-Swedish wars were fought on Finnish soil 
and required the efforts of Finnish country and town people – 
accommodating, feeding and provisioning the troops, sometimes 
for their own army, and sometimes for the occupying enemy.
Furthermore, Swedish crown’s peacetime plans and projects for 
the development of its eastern defences usually also required the 
efforts and services of Finnish peasants and townspeople, from 
the saltpetre production of the 17th century to the construction 
of the sea fortress of Sveaborg in the 18th century. Thus, the civil-
ian citizens of the eastern part of the realm were affected by the 
needs of military maintenance, both during wartime and in times 
of peace, more frequently than their western neighbours.
The chapters are thematically divided into three parts, the first 
of which deals with the financing of wars. It is opened by Jaakko 
Björklund, who in Chapter 2 illustrates how the officers of the 
Swedish army largely financed the Ingrian War (1609–1617), 
in which the Swedes conquered the provinces of Ingria and 
Kexholm from Russia. As half a century of almost uninterrupted 
warfare had emptied the treasuries of the Swedish Realm, and 
as it was simultaneously fighting another war against the Danes, 
the Ingrian War became almost a private enterprise of the high 
officers of the army. Björklund’s evidence shows that, without 
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the officers, their capital and connections, and their willingness 
to finance the warfare, the Ingrian War would have ended in 
catastrophe, instead of becoming one of the founding stones of 
Sweden’s Age of Greatness.
In Chapter 3, Kasper Kepsu continues the theme by discussing 
the burghers of Nyen, the Swedish settlement and largest trading 
town in Ingria, and their role as financers of the Great Northern 
War (1700–1721), which marked the end of Swedish Ingria and the 
ceding of the area back to Russia. As the battle over Ingria and 
Finland prolonged, the Nyen merchants – and particularly the 
wealthiest of them, Johan Henrik Frisius – became indispensable 
for the crown as suppliers and financiers. Even though Frisius and 
his colleagues were refugees from their destroyed hometown, they 
had better international connections and credit standing than 
the Swedish crown and managed to operate more efficiently at the 
markets than the royal officials.
In Chapter 4 that concludes the first part, Petri Talvitie analyses 
the sales of crown farms as a form of financing the war. The early 
modern Swedish crown was a major landowner, as, under Swedish 
law, all farms deserted or unable to pay their taxes three years in 
a row became crown property. Talvitie shows how the selling of 
these farms to private buyers became an important source of rev-
enue in the 18th century, first to finance the Great Northern War 
and later to cover the massive public debt created by the war. By 
purchasing crown farms, private Swedish and Finnish individuals 
became indirectly important financiers of war.
The second part deals with the role of countryside and rural 
population in military maintenance. It is opened by Mirkka 
Lappalainen, who in Chapter 5 analyses the manufacturing of 
potassium nitrate in late 16th- and early 17th-century Finland. In 
order to secure its self-sufficiency in gunpowder manufacturing at 
the eve of its Age of Greatness, the Swedish crown built a network 
of state-owned saltpetre works and obliged peasants to deliver the 
raw materials. The system did not function as hoped for several 
reasons, not least because of the burdensome ‘saltpetre tax’, which 
created conflicts between the local peasants and the crown’s men, 
and it was fairly quickly abandoned for other solutions.
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Next, in Chapter 6, Sampsa Hatakka discusses the mainte-
nance challenges of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, argu-
ably one of the biggest military catastrophes in Swedish history. 
Hatakka shows that maintenance problems were one of the root 
causes for the catastrophe. The war was declared without proper 
preparations, and the decision makers in Stockholm realised 
only too late that Finland lacked grain storages, mills and bak-
eries. The crown’s hastily attempts to improve the situation by 
building new infrastructure and outsourcing bread-making to 
civilians were of little avail, thanks to scarce population, lim-
ited resources, and transportation difficulties. Thus, the Swedish 
army had to use the critical first months of the war for solving 
maintenance problems instead of fighting, a fact that contrib-
uted heavily to its loss.
In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the third part, Anu Lahtinen 
offers a long-term microhistorical perspective of the effects of the 
military on the rural population by following the history of two 
southern Finnish villages, Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi, from the 16th 
to the 18th century. Although the villages were directly touched 
by war only a couple of times during the period, they were con-
tinuously shaped by the indirect presence of warfare and military 
readiness. They paid taxes to finance the military, lost a significant 
amount of their male workforce in wars, were obliged to provide 
upkeep for passing troops, and had to endure new manor lords 
who gained land grants in return for military service and dis-
turbed the local power balance.
The third part deals with the role of towns and urban population 
in military maintenance. The chapters by Juha-Matti Granqvist 
and Sofia Gustafsson discuss the town of Helsinki during 
the construction of Fortress Sveaborg. Founded in 1747 to be the 
keystone of the Swedish Realm’s eastern defence, Sveaborg was 
the biggest construction project in the history of the old realm and 
turned the small Finnish town of Helsinki into a massive building 
site. The fortress needed massive amounts of construction materi-
als, as well as food, drink and accommodation for its many thou-
sands of soldiers and workers.
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In Chapter 8, Juha-Matti Granqvist traces the evolution of 
the Helsinki burgher community during the fortress construc-
tion years, arguing that the close and long-lasting interaction 
between the town and the fortress gave birth to a special ‘military 
town bourgeoisie’. Guided by the forces of supply and demand, 
through the process of trial and error, the local burgher commu-
nity slowly evolved into a shape that was ideal in serving the mili-
tary. In Chapter 9, Sofia Gustafsson discusses the soldier billeting 
system, in which the townspeople were obliged to lodge soldiers in 
their homes. Gustafsson shows that, even though the billeting was 
a heavy burden to the local burghers, the co-existence of soldiers 
and civilians in same houses and rooms was in itself surprisingly 
peaceful. One of the reasons is that the garrison soldiers began, 
from an early stage, to interact closely with the local community, 
demonstrated for example by the numerous marriages between 
them and the local women.
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